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A STATUTORY APPROACH TO THE TAX PROBLEMS
OF THE MORTGAGOR CONSEQUENT UPON
REDUCTION OF THE MORTGAGE DEBT
THOMAS J. SNEEt

HOULD the less sanguine of our economists be correct and a business
recession of substantial magnitude and duration terminate the
current era of high productivity, the recent commitment of so much of
our inflated wealth into real estate of equally inflated value will perforce
result in widespread compromise of mortgage indebtedness with concomitant multiplication of tax problems arising from such cancellation.
Unfortunate for both taxpayer and attorney is the fact that few areas
in the tax field reveal greater uncertainty or a greater diversity of
theory and solution than does that relating to the realization of income
through reduction of mortgage indebtedness. Much has been written on
the subject in an effort to analyse, to reconcile and to distinguish. A fair
historical appraisal, however, cannot but lead to a conviction that a
quarter century of case law has not only failed to establish a uniform
and consistent approach to the problems involved but rather has left
the field basically unsettled and marked by judicial controversy and
contradiction.
One factor contributing to this confusion and discord has, undoubtedly,
been the absence of specific statutory directive. Apart from a few minor
provisions of limited scope, the Internal Revenue Code is silent on the
subject. The notion that income is derived from cancellation of indebtedness emerged in the case law and that law has constituted the
medium of its development. And that development has too often reflected the sympathies and prejudices, taxwise, of the jurist rather than
thoughtful consideration of basic principles.
The American Law Institute in its Income Tax Project has undertaken to develop improved technical provisions for income tax statutory
law and in connection therewith has proposed a codification of the law
relating to cancellation of indebtedness.' So far as mortgage indebtedness is concerned, it in general proposes to find taxable income from
reduction of indebtedness in all instances where a mortgagee compromises his debt with a solvent mortgagor, whether or not the latter
be personally liable on the bond. In adopting such a rule the Institute
was necessarily compelled, at various points, to adopt positions opposed
S

t Lecturer in Law, Fordhan University School of Law.
1. A.L.I., FEDERAL INComE TAX STATUTE, Tentative Draft No. 4 (1951). Hereinafter
referred to as Tentative Draft No. 4. See Webster, Some Comments on the Income Tax

Project of the American Law Institute, 12 FED. BAR J. 59 (1951).
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to certain of the decided cases. In this paper it is proposed to examine
the case law pertinent to the realization of income through such cancellation of mortgage indebfedness in an effort to determine the extent to
which this action of the Institute has been arbitrary and to what extent,
despite the apparent conflict, it is actually reflecting more recent trends
evident in the decisions.
"Section X116-(a) . .. Income shall result from a cancellation of a
taxpayer's indebtedness whenever and to the extent that the face amount
of such indebtedness exceeds the amount of the consideration for such
cancellation... ,2
That taxable income results from a reduction of mortgage indebtedness
incurred as a loan or for the acquisition of property was not a fact
easily recognized nor readily accepted by jurists before whom such
matters first appeared and prior to 1931 the Commissioner's contention
that gain was thereby realized was not favorably received? Since the
Kirby Lumber Co.4 and American Chicle Co. cases, however, there has
been no serious attempt to dispute the fact that as a general proposition
the compromise of a debt for less than its face value does produce income
to the debtor. While these decisions continue to be unpopular with some
of the lower courts which have accordingly "been astute to avoid"' the
application of the doctrine, sizeable segments of the problem have, therefore, been, albeit reluctantly, recognized as immune from further attack.
So where the mortgaged property has either retained its original value,
or, despite a decrease therein, has retained a value at the time of the
compromise at least equal to the debt remaining before the compromise,I
it is now beyond controversy that a solvent mortgagor, unconditionally
liable on the bond, who retains the property and settles the mortgage
debt for less than the face thereof, realizes income in the amount of the
difference. Within these factual limitations, then, the proposed statute reflects the case law so far, at least, as the taxable event is concerned.
"Comment 2, to Section X116 (a) :-The proposed provision is intended
to extinguish any vitality that may remain to the Kerbaugh-Empirerule,
2. Tentative Draft No. 4 at 23.
3. See .Amaerican Tobacco Co., 20 B.T.A. 586 (1930); Eastern Steamship Lines, 17
B.T.A. 787 (1929); Independent Brewing Co. of Pittsburgh, 4 B.T.A. 870 (1926).
4. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931). Here taxpayer was held
to have realized taxable income when it purchased its own bonds at a discount.
5. Helvering v. American Chide Co., 291 U. S. 426 (1934).
6. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 327 (1943).
7. Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F. 2d 104 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934).
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271 U. S. 170 (1926), that cancellation of an indebtedness does not
result where the considerationfor it had been lost. .. ,,I
A point of apparent conflict between the proposed law and the decisions appears, however, when we consider the case of reduction of the
mortgage debt at a time when the value of the property has decreased
to an extent that it is not in excess of the amount for which the debt is
settled. Certain cases, never overruled, have held that under such circumstances a compromise of indebtedness is not within the Kirby rule
and results, accordingly, in no taxable income. The proposed statute,
on the contrary, would hold that taxable gain is realized in this as in
the previously mentioned situations. An appraisal of the suggested law
necessitates, therefore, a consideration of the extent to which the mentioned decisions rest on sound principles and so reflect the weight of
considered judicial opinion that serious question may arise as to whether
the proposed enactment may tend toward injustice.
The theory that a mortg4gor who settles his debt for less than the
face amount does not realize taxable income to the extent of the difference if the diminution in value of the property at the time of compromise is equal to the amount of the debt cancelled has become associated primarily with two cases, Hextell v. HustonP and Hirsch. v.
Commiysioner.10 In the former case the taxpayer in 1928 purchased
real estate for $20,000, borrowing therefor $10,000 from an insurance
company to which he gave a bond and mortgage. In 1935, when the
debt amounted to $10,500, it was compromised for $6,500-apparently
also the then value of the property. The district court in 1939 found no
taxable gain. It recognized that losses from depreciation should be
postponed until disposal of the property and conceded that unless in the
transaction a loss could be determined with certainty and apart from
depreciation the taxpayer would be subject to tax under the previously
decided cases of Commissioner v. Coastwise TransportationCorp.1 and
L. D. Coddon and Bros., Inc."2 It held, however, that in the scaling
down of the debt there was a determination of loss and that this loss offset the gain. It seems quite clear that in reaching its conclusion the court
was attempting to apply what it believed to be the philosophy of Bowers
v. Kerbaugh-EmpireCo.,"3 the rule of which the proposed statute intends
to expunge from the law.
8. Tentative Draft No. 4 at 171.
9. 28 F. Supp. 521 (S.D. Iowa), appeal dismissed, 107 F.2d 1016 (8th Cir. 1939).
10. 115 F. 2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940).
11. 71 F.2d 104 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934).
12. 37 B.T.A. 393 (1938).
13. 271 U.S. 170 (1926).
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In Kerbaugh-Empire Co. the taxpayer borrowed money in the years
1911-1913, repayable in German marks or their equivalent in United
States gold coin, and, having lost the money in the years 1913-1918,
repaid the debt in 1921 in dollars, at a time when marks were greatly
depreciated. The Supreme Court in 1926 found no taxable income,
ostensibly on two grounds. The first was that the transaction did not
produce benefit to the taxpayer within the definition of income as gain
derived from capital or from labor. The second is best e-xpressed in the
words of the court: "The contention that the item in question is cash
gain disregards the fact that the borrowed money was lost and that the
2114
excess of such loss over income was more than the amount borrowed ...
While superficial consideration of the two cases might well suggest
that the second ground of Kerbaugh-Empire established a rule properly
applicable in the Hextell situation, one favorably disposed to such a
solution is confronted immediately by the thwarting implications of the
intervening decision of Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.", There the

taxpayer attempted to offset against income received in 1920 losses
suffered on the same contract in the years 1913-1916. The Court of
Appeals sustained the taxpayer's contention that the income of 1920
was merely a return of the losses of the previous years. The Supreme
Court, however, reversed and held that the money the taxpayer received
in 1920 was taxable income. It rejected the contention that, since the
transaction from which the income in 1920 was derived did not result
in net gain or profit, no taxable income was realized, and took the position that income must be determined by the result of the transactions
within the taxable year without reference to losses or events of other
years. While it nodded an acknowledgment of the existence of KerbaughEmpire Co., its apparent approval of that decision rested not on the
ground that the loss offset the gain but on the theory that there the taxpayer had neither made a profit on the transaction, nor received any
money or property which could have been made subject to the tax.
Appealing though the proposition may be that in determining gain
or loss for income tax purposes one should, in cases of compromises of
indebtedness, look to the entire transaction and not find taxable income
if the property has markedly decreased in value, the decision relied upon
as authority for that principle would itself seem, therefore, to have been
rejected and discredited by the court which announced it 0 The first
14. Id. at 175.
15. 282 U. S. 359 (1931).
16. See Darrell, Discharge of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax, 53 HARV. L.
Rxv. 977, 985 (1940); MAGIm, TAxarr INcoAm 254 (2d ed. 1945); Wright, Realization
of Income Through Cancellations,Modifications and Bargain Purchases of Indebtedness II,
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mentioned ground given in the Kerbaugh opinion has, of course, since
been effectively disposed of by Kirby and since it would be the rare instance indeed, in which devaluation of mortgaged property occurred
all in the taxable year, the Sanford & Brooks limitation would appear
to preclude the solution of the mortgagor's problems through the Kerbaugh doctrine.
An equally troubling weakness in Hextell lies in its finding that the
loss was definitely determined." Even had the decline in market value
occurred in the year of compromise, the Kerbaugh theory would still
require for its application a determination that "The result of the whole
transaction was a loss."' It will be remembered that in the latter case
the taxpayer no longer had the borrowed money-he had lost it. Not
only did the Supreme Court later' 9 emphasize the fact that in Kerbaugh
the final outcome of the transaction was revealed, but in two cases,
antecedent to Hextell, the exact argument relied upon therein had been
made and rejected.
The first of these was Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation
Corp.20 There the mortgagor of a fleet of ships compromised its debt
for less than the face value of its notes. Although the value of the ships
was at the time of settlement greater than the amount of the compromise,
the ships had, nevertheless, depreciated in value more than the gain
from the purchase of the notes. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, however, refused to apply the doctrine of Kerbaugh-Empire Co. on
the ground that the taxpayer still owned and operated the ships. In
L. D. Coddon and Bros. Inc., 21 property purchased for $80,000 had declined in value to $20,000 and the mortgagor settled the remaining $19,500 due on notes for $12,000. The Board of Tax Appeals, holding that
Kerbaugh did not control, said that the doctrine of that case "is limited
to completed transactions. . . .Since the property mortgaged to secure
the obligation . . .in this case was still held by the petitioner . . .the
doctrine of that case is not applicable .... Therefore, the fact that the
49 MicH. L. REv. 667, 674 (1951).

Compare, however, 2 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL IN-

COwE TAXATION § 11.20 (1942), and Lynch, Some Tax Effects of Cancellation of Indebtedness, 13 FORD. L. REV. 145, 152 (1944).
17. See Surrey, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Income Tax Treatment o Cancellation of Indebtedness, 49 YALE L.
18.

J.

1153, 1169 (1940).

Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 175 (1926).

19. "But the transaction (in Kerbaugh-Empire Co.] as a whole was a loss and the
contention was denied." United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1, 3 (1931).
"Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, is not applicable. The final outcome of
the dealings was revealed-the taxpayer suffered a loss." Helvering v. American Chicle
Co., 291 U.S. 426, 430 (1934).
20. 71 F. 2d 104 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934).
21. 37 B.T.A. 393 (1938).
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market value of the real estate of petitioner was considerably less in
the taxable year than the original price paid for it is immaterial."2
Finally to be noted is the conclusion of the district court in Frank v.
United States,' decided in 1942. In the course of its analysis the court
characterizes as a "novel theory" the proposition advanced in Hextell
v. Huston that the "loss" in capital value offset the gain on adjustment
of the mortgage, and states that the Hextell case did not come within the
doctrine of Kerbaugh-Einpire Co. because there was no final outcome
disclosing loss; that the owner had not "disposed of his property so as
to come within the scope of the Bowers decision."
This would appear to be the sound view. The recognition of taxable
gain or loss in mere appreciation or shrinkage in value has not found
favor in the tax field generally. Quite apart from the valuation problem,
there is the equally serious question whether the depressed value does
in fact represent the final outcome. While it may have appeared to an
economically discouraged court in 1939 that the then depression level
of real estate values was fixed for all time and that a loss was actually
and finally determined, the recent recoupment of such values within a
few years has demonstrated the wisdom of the reluctance to recognize
value decline as a criterion of loss, absent a disposition of the property.
What, if any, force is presently exerted by the Kerbaugh doctrine
would seem then to be of such limited application as not to affect the
reduction of the real estate mortgage debt in instances where the mortgagor retains the property. This seems to have been generally recognized sub silentio by the lower courts for, despite an occasional reference
to the doctrine,24 there has been no decision since Hextell which has
attempted to solve the problem of such a compromise of a mortgage
debt solely by application of the doctrine.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it would still appear rash indeed to
intimate, as does the quoted comment of the Institute, that the Kerbaugh
doctrine is moribund. Such a conclusion becomes tenable only by
ignoring relevant and significant implications contained in the opinion
of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner v. Jacobson.' There
the respondent in 1922 and 1923 acquired a 99 year lease with improvements. In 1925 he borrowed $90,000 secured by a mortgage -on the
property. The money was in large part expended to reduce the existing
encumbrance, to pay for an addition to a building, and for expenses
incurred in connection with the loan. In 1925 the leasehold and improvements had a cost of $116,589. The Tax Court found that in 1938 they
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 399.
44 F. Supp. 729 (E. D. Pa.), af'd, 131 F. 2d 864 (3d Cir. 1942).
See Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F. 2d 68 (6th Cr. 1943).

25. 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
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had a value of $80,000. In the years 1938-1940 respondent repurchased
then outstanding bonds below their face value, and the Supreme Court,
in 1949, decided that he had realized taxable income in the difference
between the face of the bonds and the amount for which they were repurchased. In the opinion, however, Mr. Justice Burton, speaking for
the court, referred three times to the doctrine which we have come to
associate with Kerbaugh-Empire Co.
The first observation occurs in his introductory remarks where he
states that the money borrowed by the respondent was not traced "into
identifiable losses offsetting the debtor's realized gains from the discharge of these obligations."2" Again, in the first footnote we find the
statement that there was not a sufficient and clear ascertainment of
either the total amount of the borrowed funds expended on the property
or in discharge of existing encumbrances thereon or of the shrinkage in
value thereof "to permit consideration of its use as an offset to the
respondent's gains in 1938, 1939 or 1940. See 2 Mertens, Law of Feder'
al Income Taxation, sec. 11.20 and n. 99 (1942)." 27
Finally, in the
fourth footnote, he again refers to the varied uses to which the money
was applied and says that "it is not practical in this case to determine
his losses from his resulting investments, and much less to offset them
against his gains now in issue. His tax benefits from those losses are
thus postponed until some such occasion as the sale of the properties reflecting them makes it possible to ascertain the losses clearly."'2 ,
While it may be possible summarily to dismiss the references to Kerbaugh found in the Kirby and American Chicle Co. cases 0 as made not
for the purpose of approving the Kerbaugh doctrine but rather to show
why in any event the doctrine was inapplicable to the facts of those
cases, the mentioned comments in Jacobson merit more serious consideration. They seem to intimate that clear establishment of the precise
amount of the borrowed money which was used to purchase or refinance
property together with a certain ascertainment of the shrinkage in the
value of that property might well have resulted in the application of the
Kerbaugh rule, despite the fact that the losses in value seem to have
occurred prior to the taxable years and even though there was no final
disposition of the property.
That this is the meaning of the court seems clearly indicated by its
reference to the particular section and footnote of Mertens' work on income taxation. Mr. Mertens is a strong admirer of the Kerbaugh doctrine and has been vigorous and eloquent in his condemnation of the
26. Id. at 30.
27. Id. at 35.
28. Id. at 39.
29. See note 19 supra.
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arbitrary application of the annual taxing method so as to effect the
practical destruction of that doctrine ° And it is in the particular section
to which reference is made by the court that he presents his arguments
favoring the continued application of the Kerbaugi: rule, while conceding
in the cited footnote, that there may be cases where it becomes impossible to allocate the funds cancelled to any particular property, in
which event it would not be unreasonable to hold that the taxpayer must
wait until the year of disposition to realize for tax purposes the diminution in value of the property.
"Comment 2, to Section X116 (a) ... The provision also overrules the
corollary evolved in recent cases that cancellation of part of a debt,
incurred in the purchase of property which has shrunken in value as
much or more than the amount cancelled, is merely a readjustment of
originalpurchase price and not income."3 '
An alternative approach to the tax problem of the mortgagor who
compromises his debt at a time when the property has declined to a
point where its market value does not exceed the adjusted debtP2 is
linked with the case of Hirsch v. Commissioner, born also of the depression years and decided just one year after Hextell. In Hirsch the
petitioner in 1928 purchased real estate at a cost of $29,000, assuming
mortgages of $19,000. In 1929, when the mortgages were due he procured a loan from a bank which he used to pay off the encumbrances.
A new mortgage given to the bank at the time of the loan was assigned
and in 1936 the petitioner settled the debt of $18,000 with the assignee
for $8,000. At the time of the compromise the value of the property had
declined to $8,000. The Board of Tax Appeals found taxable income
in the difference of $10,000. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, while recognizing that the question whether the taxpayer
had gain or loss could be determined only when he sold the property,
found no taxable income on the theory that while the transaction was a
forgiveness of indebtedness, it was in its essence a reduction in purchase
price.
30. See Lynch, supra note 16, at 152. Professor Magill's suggestion that the doctrines
of Kerbaugh-Empire Co. and Sanford & Brooks Co. have probably been modified by
Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943), would also seem necessarily to be predicated upon a belief in the continued vitality of the former case. BLGar,, T, =XAL LZco= (2d ed. 1945).
31. Tentative Draft No. 4 at 171.

32. On the question of the required relation between the decline in value and the adjusted or unadjusted debt, see Lynch, supra note 16, at 154; Wright, supra note 16, at 677;
Ralph W. Gwinn, T. C. Memo. op. Dkt. No. 108, 144 (June 9, 1944).
33. 115 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1940).
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The "reduction of cost" theory as a means of shielding the mortgagor
from tax liability at the time of reducing his indebtedness did not
originate with the Hirsch decision. It had, for example, previously been
utilized by the Board of Tax Appeals in the American Chicle Co.84 and
Coastwise Transportation Corp.3 5 cases. In the first of these the
Supreme Court merely noted and then ignored the contention, and
in the latter case the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit soundly
rejected it. Nor, as these cases clearly show, did the theory emerge as
something peculiar to the instance where the value of the property had
declined below that of the debt. In American Chicle Co. the Board saw
a reduction of purchase price although there was no evidence of change
in the value of the property, and in Coastwise Transportation Corp.
the shrinkage in value had not brought it below the remaining debt.
This consistency on the part of the Board has much to commend it, for
if the notion that a compromise of mortgage indebtedness constituted
a reduction of purchase price were valid at all, its validity should be
unaffected by the subsequent history of the property or at least by the
relative amount of diminution in value. 0 Yet, since the rejection of the
theory in the last named case, no serious attempt has been made to
apply it except where the property has declined in value below the
amount of the mortgage debt due. As such it assumes the character
of an artifice, or as one court has put it, ".

.

. a formula for lifting

certain types of debt adjustment out of the Kirby rule. ....,,37
Although the theory of reduction of purchase price was thereafter
applied in mortgage cases decided in the Eighth"8 and Sixth89 Circuits
and in a limited number of non-mortgage cases, there is little, except
sympathy for the taxpayer, to recommend it. True, an occasional case
may be found where the transaction does in fact amount to a reduction
of purchase price. Such a result may obtain for example where the
contract provides for renegotiation" or even where a new contract supplants the old and provides for cash rather than installment or deferred payments. 4 ' But to find in a simple reduction of indebtedness
transaction, without more, a reduction of purchase price merely because
34. Helvering v. American Chide Co., 291 U.S. 426 (1934).
35. Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F. 2d 104 (1st. Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934).
36. See Wright, supra note 16, at 677.
37. Claridge Apartments Co., 1 T. C. 163 (1942), rev'd in part, 138 F. 2d 962 (7th
Cir. 1943), rev'd, 323 U.S. 141 (1944).
38. Helvering v. Killian Co., 128 F. 2d 433 (8th Cir. 1942).
39. Commissioner v. Sherman, 135 F. 2d 68 (6th Cir. 1943).
40. See Pinkney Packing Co., 42 B.T.A. 823 (1940).
41. See Desmoines Improvement Co., 7 B.T.A. 279 (1927).
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of a decline in value seems completely gratuitous. This was clearly
recognized by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit when in rejecting the contention of the Board of Tax Appeals that the cancellation in
Coastwise Transportation Corp.4 - was a reduction of purchase price, it
observed that there was no evidence that the transactions had anything
to do with the purchase price of the vessels. "The parties dealt solely
about the notes and their value and not about the ships or their value.
The offer ... and the acceptance ... were for the purchase of the notes
at a reduced price and not an agreement that the latter should reduce
the purchase price of the ships. The gains came about from the reduction in the value of the notes." 3
To the same effect is the reaction of the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit when in 1944 it decided Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street
Corp. v. Commissioner." In the course of its opinion it virtually rejects
the Hirsch theory and says: "At any rate, the distinction, if valid, is
limited to a purchase money obligation where the vendor-mortgagee,
in negotiations directly relating to the purchase price, agrees to a reduction. ...""
The theory of reduction of purchase price appears even more clearly
fictitious where the mortgagee is not the vendor but merely one who has
made a loan to the mortgagor, and whose only relation to the property
at any time has been that of one having a security interest therein. Such
a mortgagee never had the power to determine the price of the property,
and once the vendor is fully paid, the sale transaction is forever closed,
and there remains but a loan to be repaid. Yet in the Hirsch case itself,
the mortgagee who reduced the remaining debt was not the vendor. The
court dismissed this fact as unimportant." That it is not unimportant
was recognized in Frank v. United States,47 a case similar in its facts to
Hirsch. The petitioner had borrowed money part of which he used to
pay off a purchase money mortgage. In connection with the loan he gave
a mortgage represented by bonds which he repurchased at a discount. In
holding that taxable income resulted the court said: "It must be kept
in mind that those who lent the $110,000 to the plaintiffs in 1927 were
42. Commissioner v. Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F. 2d 104 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 595 (1934).
43. 71 F. 2d at 105.
44. 147 F. 2d 453 (2d Cir. 1944).
45. Id. at 457 (italics supplied). See Gehring Publishing Co., I T. C. 345 (1942), in
which the negotiations did relate directly to a readjustment of the purchase price.
46. Hirsch v. Commissioner, 115 F. 2d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 1940).
47. 44 F. Supp. 729 (E. D. Pa.), af'd, 131 F. 2d 864 (3d Cir. 1942). At the time the
bonds were repurchased the value of the property was less than either the adjusted basis
or the amount of the debt.
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not those who sold the property to them in 1926.2148 As noted above, in
Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp., the court pointed out that if the
theory had any validity this could be so only where the negotiations were
with the vendee. And finally in Commissioner v. Jacobson,49 although
again part of the loan had been used to refinance a purchase money mortgage and to build an addition to the property, the court observed that:
"These were not purchase money bonds. The gains from their cancellation were not akin to reductions in balances due on the prices of previously acquired property. The respective sellers of the bonds bore no
relation to the respondent other than that of creditors."50
That the doctrine is not yet dead, however, is seen in the recent case
of Charles L.. Nutter."' There the taxpayer borrowed money from a
bank to purchase securities and in connection with the loan pledged the
securities with the bank. When the securities had decreased in value
below the amount of the loan the taxpayer transferred them to the
bank in full discharge of the debt. Disregarding the fact that the bank
was not the vendor, the Tax Court in 1946 held that no taxable income
resulted. While the opinion is so disorganized and enigmatic as to defy
complete understanding, it has generally been interpreted as holding
that the transaction was in the nature of a purchase money borrowing
and a reduction of sale price.
There is much to suggest, however, that, absent a Supreme Court decision to the contrary, the Nutter case may prove to be the final expression of the theory. The signs of revolt are evident. In Frank v.
United States 2 the district court voiced the opinion that the Hirsch case
cannot be reconciled with the rule enunciated by the -Supreme Court in
Kirby and American Chicle Co. In Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp.
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit considered irrational the
theory that the Kirby case is inapplicable where the reduced indebtedness
is a purchase money obligation.63 And finally, in Nutter itself four
judges dissented, three joining in a vigorous rejection of the notion that
the compromise amounted to a scaling down of the purchase price.
The possibility of a surprise decision by the Supreme Court cannot,
of course, be ruled out. In the American Dental Co.54 case, Mr. Justice
48. 44 F. Supp. at 733.
49. 336 U.S. 28 (1949).
50. Id. at 39.
51. 7 T. C. 480 (1946).

52.

44 F. Supp. 729, 732 (E. D. Pa.), aff'd, 131 F. 2d 864 (3d Cir. 1942).

53.

147 F. 2d 453, 457 (2d Cir. 944).

54. Helvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322, 327 (1943). In the Fifth Avenue
-Fourteenth Street Corp. case, the Court of Appeals expressed doubt that the Supreme
Court by its passing mention, intended to approve the case.
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Reed noted in passing the fact that in Hirsch a forgiveness of a purchase money indebtedness had been treated as a readjustment of the
contract rather than a gain. While reading into such a passing comment
an approval of the decisions is unwarranted, there was, nevertheless, no
disapproval. Even more provocative is the reference to the problem in
Commissioner v. Jacobson, where in the opening words of the opinion
appears the oliservation: "The debtor's obligations were not unpaid
balances of purchase prices which could be readjusted by the discharge
of obligations.""
In the Jacobson case itself, however, one finds assurance that the
Hirsch doctrine, at least in its present form, will not be given "top lever,
approval. Such assurance results from the fact that in its broader aspect
the Jacobson opinion has reaffirmed the principle that in tax matters
as elsewhere the courts should look to the realities of the situation and
call a transaction what it is and nothing more. Under the impact of
such a philosophy the Hirsch doctrine will be more widely recognized
for the device that it is-and discarded. This is not to say that legitimate reductions of purchase price will no longer be given the tax treatment they deserve. Despite Jacobson there will continue to be compromises of debts in the nature of bona fide gifts. So too there will continue to be bona fide tax free reductions in purchase price. But there
will also be taxable reductions of debts relating to purchase price. They
should not, and, as time moves on, are less likely to be confused.
"Section X119 (a) ...There may be excluded from gross income all or
part of the amount of any income from cancellation of indebtedness ...
if the taxpayer files a consent to the reduction of the basis of any property held by the taxpayer... ? 1
To say that, absent a bona fide gift or a true reduction of purchase
price resulting from negotiations between vendor and vendee directly
related to the price, a satisfaction of a mortgage debt for an amount less
than its face value results in taxable income to the mortgagor-debtor
is not, however, to answer the practical problem that the taxable event
may and often does occur at a time when the mortgagor is least able
to pay the tax. Congress has, of course, long since supplied a solution in
the case of corporate taxpayers where the indebtedness is represented
by securities: the taxpayer may elect not to pay the tax realized on the
compromise of indebtedness but instead may elect to reduce by the
amount of the compromise the basis of its property. 7 The proposed
55. 336 U.S. 28, 30 (1949).

56. Tentative Draft No. 4 at 27.
57.

L'T. RE ,.

CODE

§§ 22 (B)(9), (10) and 113(a) (3).
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statute would extend this privilege to the non-corporate taxpayer and
in the case of the corporation eliminate the securities limitation.
While Congress has not yet so extended such a relief provision, the fact
that in the Revenue Act of 1951, it has converted its present provision
from a temporary to a permanent status 8 indicates a recognition of merit
therein. There is, of course, much to be said for the proposed extension
so far as it affects the mortgagor who compromises hfs debt for cash
while retaining his property. 0 It results, at the option of the taxpayer,
in the same practical effect (laying aside for the moment the question
of the character of the gain on which the tax is ultimately paid) sought
by and attained through the Hirsch doctrine since under the latter theory
a "reduction in purchase price" would be reflected in a reduced basisand it achieves this result without doing violence to either reality or
principle.
In this connection, however, one fact must be borne in mind: that the
sole purpose of such an option is the postponement of the tax. This
should, therefore, be its only effect. Where the taxpayer realizes gain
through payment of a mortgage debt at less than its face value it is
ordinary gain.6 ° Yet if the property mortgaged is a capital asset or if it
is used in the taxpayer's trade or business and on disposition there is
net gain, the gain will receive capital gain treatment." If the exercise
of the option involved nothing more than a reduction of the basis of
the property by the amount of the debt compromised, the taxpayer could
at will convert an ordinary gain on cancellation into a capital gain on
disposition.
The proposed statute would meet this problem in part by varying the
amount of reduction and in part by providing that where the debt was
incurred in connection with the purchase of a capital asset or was secured
throughout its entire existence by a capital asset, the gain from reduction
of indebtedness should be considered a capital gain. 2 Such treatment
58. Revenue Act of 1951, § 304(a).
59. The proposed statute would permit exercising the option to defer payment of the
tax even where the debt cancellation involved a disposition of the property, and Indeed,
even though the taxpayer has no other property the basis of which might be reduced.

Such an extension would appear to be unnecessary to the goal of uniformity in tax treatment of the more common transactions resulting in the reduction of mortgage indebtedness.
60. I. T. 4018, I.R.B. 1950-15.
61. INT. REv. CODE § 117j.
62. Section X117 states: "Income from cancellation of indebtedness resulting under
section X116 shall be treated as capital gain wherever such indebtedness was incurred

or assumed under any of the following circumstances: (a) On the acquisition of a capital
asset; or (b) For money-(1) which is used to acquire a capital asset which becomes

security for such indebtedness, or (2) where the full amount of the indebtedness Is secured
at its inception by a capital asset owned by the taxpayer, and such an asset continues
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of the gain, however, is not suggested because of the nature of the gain
nor because of basic principles, tax or otherwise. It is proposed primarily because it produces a desirable mathematical effect where the
transaction resulting in cancellation involves the disposition of a capital
asset.' No other reason is offered for its application in the case of a
cash settlement of the debt than that of uniformity.
While the suggested treatment does give the same result where the
taxpayer who compromises his debt pays the accruing tax immediately
that would obtain if he elected to reduce the basis of the mortgaged
property where the latter is a capital asset, such a proposition should
be approached with marked caution. Unless we are again to accept the
Hirsch theory of a reduction in purchase price, there would seem to be
little justification, merely because the mortgaged property was a capital
asset, in considering gain from reduction of indebtedness as a capital
gain. Whatever plausibility may adhere to the idea where the mortgagee
is the vendor fades when the mortgagee is a third party lender-and
vanishes when the debt has no relation to the purchase of the property.
Such a proposal involves discriminatory treatment among mortgagortaxpayers. If what appears to be a reduction in indebtedness is in fact
a reduction of purchase price resulting from negotiations between the
vendor and vendee directly relating to the purchase price, (the requirements laid down by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp.)," then no taxable event has occurred and no special treatment is necessary in regard to the reduction
of basis or to the character of gain resulting on ultimate disposition.
If these requirements are not met and the compromise constitutes a
taxable reduction of a debt, then as yet no sound reason has been offered
why the income resulting should be ordinary income to one but capital
gain to another merely because of the fortuitous fact that the nature of
the security differs. It should further be noted that the proposal does
not harmonize immediate payment of the tax on accrual with postponement until disposition of the property where the latter, though not
a capital asset, is used in trade or business and thus given capital gain
treatment under Section 117j of the Internal Revenue Code-the essential provisions of which are included, though reluctantly, in the proposed
law as Section X230.
Rather than multiplying fiction by treating as capital gain that which
as security for the indebtedness up to the time of cancellation; or (c) In eschange or substitution for an indebtedness of the type described in (a) or (b) above." Tentative Draft
No. 4 at 26.
63. Tentative Draft No. 4 at 189.
64. See Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 453, 457 (2d

Cir. 1944).
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is by its nature ordinary gain, consideration might well be given to the
possibility of providing that, to the extent that an ordinary gain has been
derived from a cancellation of indebtedness, a loss on disposition of the
mortgaged property, otherwise recognizable only as a capital loss, shall
be recognized as an ordinary loss, and that a gain, although otherwise
treated as a capital gain, to the extent that it represents a gain from
a cancellation of indebtedness shall be considered as an ordinary gain.
"Introductory Comment 2 .... Where a debt is settled with property,
the provision specifying the amount of cancellationincome that is realized
limits it to the segment of gain that is true cancellation income, represented by the excess of the face amount of the debt over the fair market
value of the property conveyed in settlement. The difference 'between
the basis of the property and its fair market value is left to be treated
as gain or loss on the disposition of the property.",
Should mortgaged property constituting a capital asset decrease in
value below both basis and the debt, and the mortgagor then sell the
property and turn the proceeds over to the mortgagee in cancellation
of his indebtedness, he would realize a capital loss on the sale and
ordinary gain on the cancellation. With real property used in trade or
business a similar result would obtain except that the loss would be
ordinary as well as the gain. And, of course, the tax consequences are no
different if the mortgagor first compromises his debt for cash and later
sells the property. Where, however, he has permitted the mortgagee to
foreclose or has surrendered the property to the mortgagee in cancellation of the indebtedness the gain has been held to be a capital gain.00
It is obvious that where the mortgagee at a foreclosure sale accepts the
property, when worth less than the debt and the mortgagor's basis, in
full satisfaction of the debt, foregoing to procure a deficiency judgment,
the mortgagor has realized taxable gain from the cancellation of his
indebtedness just as in the case of a cash compromise. That a different
result should obtain merely because of the form of the transaction stems
from the fact that in Helvering v. Hamel, 7 the Supreme Court in 1941
held that a foreclosure sale is a sale under Section 111 of the Internal
65. Tentative Draft No. 4 at 162. Section X116 provides in pertinent part that the
"amount of the consideration for a cancellation of indebtedness shall be the . . . amount
included under section X203(b) in the amount realized by the taxpayer in computing
gain or loss in respect of any other property of the taxpayer as a result of the discharge
of ... the cancelled indebtedness. Such amount is . .. (B) the value of such other proper-

ty, under section X 203 (b) (1)." Tentative Draft No. 4 at 24.
66. R. O'Dell & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 169 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948); Mendham
Corp., 9 T.C. 320 (1947); Woodsam Associates, 16 T.C. 649 (1951).
67. 311 U.S. 504 (1941).
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Revenue Code. Lower courts thereafter applied the same reasoning'to
transfers of the mortgaged property in lieu of foreclosure where the
ultimate result of the transaction was a loss.Gs When, in 1943, the first
case arose in which the mortgagee accepted the property in cancellation
of the remaining indebtedness, the Tax Court in Litz & Schramm Co.'
found no difficulty in conforming to the theory of these decisions. The
court took the position that the market value of the property was immaterial; that the question was not whether the taxpayer realized income from the discharge or forgiveness of indebtedness but rather
whether gain was realized from the disposition of property. From this it
was necessarily found that the taxpayer realized gain in the difference
between his adjusted basis and the amount of the debt. This approach
has since been uniformly followed in case of foreclosure in R. O'Dell &
Sons v. Commissioner,7° Mendliam Corp.,71 and Woodsam Associates,72
as well as in Parkerv. Delaney7 3 where the property was surrendered.
Such a solution while simple and plausible ignores the fact that we
are here dealing with an atypical kind of gain, that the difference between
the value of the property at the time of surrender or foreclosure and the
amount of the debt is gain from a cancellation of indebtedness. Despite
the position adopted in Lutz & Schramm Co., the realistic approach
demands the recognition that there is involved both a sale or disposition
and a reduction of indebtedness. If we accordingly separate the transaction into its elements, they resolve into a loss equal to the difference
between the adjusted basis of the property and its then market value,
and a gain equal to the difference between the market value of the property and the amount of the debt. The net gain then would be the difference between the gain on cancellation and the loss on disposition.
This is the solution of the proposed statute and there is much to commend it. It more accurately reflects what is happening and it brings into
harmony the several methods of satisfying indebtedness for less than
face value. There would seem, furthermore, to be no irreconcilable
conflict with Hamel. The problem of debt cancellation was not before
the court in that case and the proposed approach does in fact acknowledge that the foreclosure or surrender is a sale or disposition under
68. Rogers v. Commissioner, 103 F. 2d 790 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 580 (1939) ;
Wieboldt v. Commissioner, 113 F. 2d 384 (7th Cir. 1940). For a criticism of the Rogers
case see Randolph E. Paul, Federal Income Tax Problems of Mortgagors and Morigagees,
48 YALn L. J. 1315, 1324 (1939).
69. 1 T. C. 682 (1943).
70. 169 F. 2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948).
71. 9 T. C. 320 (1947).
72.

16 T. C. 649 (1951).

73. 186 F. 2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 926 (1951).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

Section 111. It merely involves the further recognition that in that sale
there is no gain but a loss; that the gain results from cancellation of the
indebtedness.
There would, of course, be no difference in the end result between
the approach of Lutz & Schramm Co. and that proposed were it not for
the capital loss treatment in the sale of capital assets and the capital
gain treatment in the sale of both capital assets and of those coming
within the scope of Section 117j. Since the gain from cancellation of
indebtedness is and should be considered ordinary gain the present approach therefore results in discriminatory tax treatment in favor of
the mortgagor who chooses to let his property go to the mortgagee in
either surrender or foreclosure rather than compromising his debt with
cash while retaining his property. It is difficult to find justification for
this, and as noted previously in the discussion of postponement through
reduction of basis, any possible injustice resulting to the mortgagor of
a capital asset may be eliminated by appropriate treatment of the loss
on disposition.
"Section X115 (a) (1) . . . the term 'indebtedness' applies . . . to an
obligation-(B) which constitutes a burden on particularproperty of the
taxpayer to pay a sum certain in money, carrying no personal liability
of such taxpayer to pay such sum." 74
The final question to be considered relates to the extent to which the
position of the proposed statute that the existence of personal liability
is immaterial to the realization of taxable income through cancellation
of indebtedness is in conflict with present case law.
Two early cases are associated with the idea that absent personal
liability no income results to an owner of real estate upon compromise of
mortgage indebtedness. That conclusion was reached by the Board of
Tax Appeals in Aimerican Seating Co.7" with a minimum of thought.
In Fulton Gold Corp.76 it was held that the lack of personal liability
took the case out of the rule of Kirby and American Chicle Co.; that
the mortgagor did not liquidate a personal debt but merely satisfied an
encumbrance on property in which it had an equity; that there was no
release of assets previously offset by the obligation of the maker of the
notes.
In Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp., the Court of Appeals for
74. Tentative Draft No. 4 at 21.
75. 14 B.T.A. 328 (1928), modified without discussion of this point, 50 F. 2d 681
(7th Cir. 1931).
76. 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934). See also Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42 B.T.A. 759 (1940); P. J.
Hiatt, 35 B.T.A. 292 (1937).
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the Second Circuit, in 1944, agreed in dicta 7 that if a taxpayer compromises a mortgage subject to which he purchased the property he
realizes no income but merely reduces the purchase price. One year
later the same court in the Crae 78 decision expressed the opinion that
abandonment to the mortgagee in lieu of foreclosure would likewise
result in no gain to a mortgagor who had no personal liability.7 And as
late as 1949 the Tax Court reaffirmed its adherence to the proposition!'
In 1946, however, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, decided
the case of Central Paper Co.s1 and found taxable income where a taxpayer, not liable on convertible trustee's certificates, but whose property was pledged to secure payment thereof, acquired for less than par
value some certificates, exchanged them for its preferred shares held
by the trustees at par for par, and cancelled the shares. The court said
that for all practical purposes they were the obligations of the taxpayer;
it had put in pledge part of its assets and each purchase at a discount
resulted in a corresponding increase of avialable assets. It was, therefore, concluded that, irrespective of the absence of an express promise
to pay, the case fell within the rule of the Kirby decision.
Later cases on sale, abandonment and foreclosure have likewise reflected the development of a judicial concept of the relation between the
non-liable mortgagor, the property and the debt which is difficult to
harmonize with the position of Fulton Gold Corp. So in the Crane case,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, despite its dicta on the
result of abandonment, expresses the view 2 that the mortgagee is a
creditor even though recourse can be had only to the land and that upon
making to the vendee an allowance of the amount of the mortgage, the
mortgagor secures a release from the charge on the property. In the
77.

See Fifth Avenue-Fourteenth Street Corp. v. Commissioner, 147 F. 2d 453 (2d Cir.

1944).
78. Commissioner v. Crane, 153 F. 2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1945). For a critical analysis
of this'proposition see Note, 49 COL. L. Ray. 845, 850 (1949).
79. Stanley Co. of America v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1122 (1949), rev'd on other
grounds, 185 F. 2d 975 (2d Cir. 1951).

80. A distinction between the liable and non-liable mortgagor in at least one situation
involving cancellation of indebtedness is contemplated by the Supreme Court in its 37th
footnote to the Crane opinion, wherein it states: "Obviously, if the value of the property
is less than the amount of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable cannot realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a different problem might
be encountered where a mortgagor abandoned the property or transferred it subject to
the mortgage without receiving boot. That is not this case." Crane v. Commissioner,
331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947). Such a distinction had not, however, been recognized in the
previously decided case of Lutz & Schramm Co., 1 T. C. 682 (1943), and was rejected in
the later case of Woodsam Associates, 16 T. C. 649 (1951).
81. Central Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 158 F. 2d 131 (6th Cir. 1946).
82. Commissioner v. Crane, 153 F. 2d 504, 506 (2d Cir. 1945).
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same case the Supreme Court, 83 holding that a non-liable mortgagor
realizes, on a sale subject to the mortgage, a benefit in the amount of the
mortgage, says that it is concerned with the reality that as owner the
mortgagor must and will treat the conditions of the mortgage exactly as
if they were his personal obligation; that on a transfer subject to the
mortgage, the benefit to him is as real and substantial as if the mortgage
were discharged.
The early cases of surrender by a non-liable mortgagor to the mortgagee were instances where the mortgagor suffered a loss and it was
held that such a transaction was neither a sale nor exchange since there
was no release from personal liability.' 4 The problem of gain by a nonliable mortgagor through surrender came squarely before the Tax
Court in 1943 in the case of Lutz & Schramm Co.8" There the petitioner
had no personal liability on a mortgage given in connection with a loan.
At the time of the surrender the debt exceeded the adjusted basis of
the property which in turn was greatly in excess of the market value.
As noted above the court avoided the entire problem of cancellation of
indebtedness and found taxable income resulting from the disposition
of property. Since the debt was $300,000, the court reasoned that this
was the amount the taxpayer had received in the transaction-even
though the property was when surrendered worth but $97,000.
This approach to the problem of the non-liable mortgagor was followed by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in deciding the case
of Parkerv. Delaney"0 in 1950. There the taxpayer took title to property subject to existing mortgages-the only consideratidn involved. Later
he quit-claimed the property to the mortgagee. It was held that the
taxpayer realized gain from the disposition of property regardless of
whether the transaction be considered an abandonment rather than a
sale. The court, however, went a step further and stated that by the
surrender the property in the hands of the taxpayer was relieved of the
mortgage liens and obligations and that so far as he was concerned as
owner these were paid, even though he had no personal liability for them.
The question of gain resulting to a non-liable mortgagor where the debt
is cancelled in conjunction with foreclosure proceedings was presented
8
the
to the Tax Court in Mendham Corp."' and in Woodsam Associates,"
latter decided in 1951. Taxable income was again found to arise, not as
a result of reduction of indebtedness, but in transactions involving a
83.
84.
F. 2d
85.
86.
87.
88.

Commissioner v. Crane, 331 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
Folin v. Commissioner, 114 F. 2d 174 (3d Cir. 1940); Stokes v. Commissioner, 124
335 (3d Cir. 1941).
1 T. C. 682 (1943).
186 F. 2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 926 (1951).
9 T. C. 320 (1947).
16 T. C. 649 (1951).
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disposition of property. The ultimate significance of these decisions is
obscured by the fact that in each case the taxpayer had obtained the
property in a tax free exchange and the court felt, therefore, free to
treat it as though it had itself received and benefited from the loans
involved-an assumption of importance in view of the fact that the court
conceived the gain to the taxpayer to be the difference between the adjusted basis of the property and the amount the taxpayer acquired in
the earlier borrowing.
A broader approach to the tax position of the non-liable mortgagor in
foreclosure proceedings, however, appears in the court's reaction to
certain contentions of the taxpayer in the Woodsam case. There the
property had been mortgaged in excess of its value and at the time of
foreclosure the value was less than the remaining debt. The court
dismissed the argument of the petitioner that mortgaging without personal
liability is a sale of but a lien with the result that no debt is created, by
referring to the comment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in the Crane case, noted above, that the mortgagee is a creditor even
though he has recourse only to the property. Again it rejected petitioner's
contention that a non-liable mortgagor cannot on a foreclosure realize
a gain in excess of the market value of the property where the latter is
less than the debt.89 True this rejection was predicated on the theory
that the entire gain resulted from a disposition of the property in which
case the market value is not one of the variables, but it is, nevertheless,
a rejection of a concept which would differentiate between mortgage
debtors on the basis of personal liability.
Conclusions
The proposed statute, insofar as it would contravene the Hextell application of the Kerbaugh-Empire doctrine and find taxable income in
a cash reduction of mortgage indebtedness notwithstanding an offsetting
decline in value of the property involved, would seem to be in accord
with the trend of present judicial thought as well as with the sound
89. Concerning the Crane footnote quoted in note 80 supra, the court here says that it
is apparent that the Supreme Court intended to reserve its views on the situation where
the mortgage was foreclosed and then states: "If the footnote from the Crane case
rise above the status of dictum, we are unable to conclude that it is of any application,
at least in circumstances such as those here present where the entire rationale must be
dependent upon the concept of basis and realized gain on foreclosure." Woodsam. Associates, 16 T. C. 649, (1951).
90. Attention is invited also to the pertinent observation of Professor Surrey on the
Fulton gold case: "But as the debt to which the property was subject became part of
the purchaser's cost basis, it is not so clear that the case can be distinguished from one
involving a personal liability." Surrey, supra note 17, at 1169-70.
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principle of predicating gain or loss from appreciation or shrinkage on
a final disposition. There remains, however, a distinct possibility of
the resurgence and revitalization of the Kerbaugh theory should an appropriate fact situation come before the Supreme Court as presently
constituted.
In rejecting the Hirsch formula of viewing a reduction of indebtedness
as a tax-free reduction in purchase price where the value of the property
at the time of settlement is not in excess of the adjusted debt, the
proposed statute would appear not only to reflect a growing body of
considered judicial opinion but also to have taken a position essential
to the placing of taxation of debt reduction on a uniform, non-discriminatory and realistic basis. Should such a provision become law, however,
jurists must be alert to discover and distinguish the rare but true case of
reduction of purchase price.
The suggestion that the essential provisions of Sections 22 (b) (9) and
113(b) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code be extended to provide that
all mortgagor-debtors who compromise their debts while retaining the
property may elect in lieu of then paying the tax to have the basis of
the property reduced in an amount equal to the gain realized is a wise
one. It makes possible the Hirsch result without resort to subterfuge
and permits the taxpayer to postpone the taxable event until such time
as the gain from cancellation may properly be offset by a diminution in
value. The advisability of the ancillary proposal, however, that certain
gains from reduction of indebtedness be considered capital is not so
evident and, in lieu thereof, consideration might be given, in the case of
capital assets, of more appropriate and integrated treatment of losses on
disposition.
The proposed resolution of the surrender or foreclosure transaction
resulting in cancellation of indebtedness into its components of loss on
disposition and gain on reduction represents a distinct advance in
the development of a realistic and uniform plan of treatment of debt reduction. It should involve the recognition of such gain as ordinary
gain in this situation as in the case of a cash compromise and elimjnate
differences in tax results based purely on the form of transaction. Inequities which would result in the case of capital assets may be avoided,
as suggested above, by suitable treatment of losses.
Finally, it would seem that the proposal of the Institute to consider
immaterial the personal liability of the mortgagor is a reflection of the
more recent judicial attitude toward the non-liable mortgagor and the
debt encumbering his property, and would, therefore, appear but to be
anticipating the position toward which the case law is presently tending.
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